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The Economics of Corruption is a collection of papers covering both the 
theoretical as well as the empirical perspectives on corruption. It deals with various 
aspects of corruption and provides a well-integrated framework for research in this 
growing and active area of inquiry. 
Besides the first chapter, “Corruption: An Overview”, written by Ajit Mishra, 
which is an excellent review of the existing literature in the field, the book consists of ten 
articles divided by three themes.  
“Corruption as phenomena [sic] is always associated with an agency structure” 
writes Ajit in the introductory chapter of the book (p. 5). Corruption arises when the 
principal and agent have conflicting objectives and the principal fails to design the 
comprehensive enforceable contract due to lack of information. It becomes complicated 
when the principal puts an incentive scheme in place so as to induce optimal action by the 
agent and hires another agent to implement this incentive scheme, referred to as 
Supervisor. Ajit classifies this Principal-Supervisor-Agent problem, broadly, into three 
different types of relationships according to the powers and responsibilities enjoyed by 
the Supervisor. 
The first theme entitled “Perspective on Corruption” consists of five articles. 
Chapter 2 of the book is an article titled “Corruption: Its Causes and Effects” by Gunnar 
Myrdal, written in the context of the South Asian economies. According to him, it is the 
existence of imperfect markets and less profit motives in the economic sphere which are 
the causes of corruption. Moreover, the loyalties, in South Asia, to less inclusive groups 
such as family, caste, religious or linguistic community causes another type of corruption 
called nepotism. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss the three different types of relationship between 
Principal, Supervisor and Agent. First, the supervisor has only an information gathering role 
and he has the power to manipulate this information. Enforcement problems like tax 
enforcement and policing are the practical examples of this relationship. Jean Triotle in his 
article titled “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organisation” 
analyses the possibilities of collusion between the Supervisor and the Agent in this 
framework. He views the organisation as a network of contracts, and according to his 
model, there exists a natural coalition between the Supervisor and the Agent. 
The second type of relationship emerges when the Supervisor has the power to 
choose the exact mechanism for the Agent. Chapter 4 is an article by Abhijit V. Banerjee. 
This article, titled “A Theory of Misgovernance”, seems to model this type of 
relationship and explains why government bureaucracies are associated with corruption. 
According to him the culture of corruption is partly explained because of underdeveloped 
institutions. 
The third type of relationship is the situation when the principal transfers all the 
power to the Supervisor and he enjoys a monopoly. Practical examples are the issuing of 
permits and licences, etc. The situation leads to output distortion as well, since the 
Supervisor has an incentive to create a shortage so that he can charge the higher price. 
The fifth chapter, titled “Pervasive Shortages under Socialism”, by Andrei Shleifer and 
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Robert Vishny, examines the shortage under socialism and attributes it to the bribe-
seeking behaviour of the self-interested planners. 
Chapter 6 of the book is devoted to the empirical evidence, provided by Paulo 
Mauro in his article titled “Corruption and Growth”. He uses different indices on 
corruption as provided by Business International (BI) for the period 1980-83 and 
quantifies the magnitude of the effects of institutional variables on growth. He confirms a 
negative relationship between growth and corruption and the main channel, through bad 
institutions affect growth, is by lowering the investment rate. 
“Design of Incentives and Organisation”, the second theme of the book, consists of 
two articles and covers the issues related to the choice of incentive instruments, like 
wages, fines, commission, or performance pay, faced by the principal for supervisor to 
avoid the collusion between them, and the role of organisational structure in the 
implementation of  these incentive schemes.    
Dilip Mookherjee and I.P.L. Png address the complicated issue of compensation 
policies in their article entitled “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How should they be 
Compensated?”. According to their analysis, high penalties for bribery and the 
commission schemes are helpful to reduce corruption, but it is optimal to reduce it 
through a commission rate. Moreover, they discuss the issues related to these commission 
schemes. As, the implementation of the incentive schemes and corruption is very much 
related to the organisational structure, Kaushik Basu, Sudipto Bhattacharya and Ajit 
Mishra discuss the structure of organisation and analyse some conditions for the control 
of corruption in their article titled “Notes on Bribery and Control of Corruption”, which 
is Chapter 8 of this book. 
The third theme is “Government, Markets, and Competition”, where three articles 
analyse the relationship between corruption and government interventions and the role of 
special interest groups in the political process. 
Chapter 9, “The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption” by Daron 
Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier, analyses the link between government interventions and 
corruption. It is market failure which creates the room for government interventions and 
which, in turn, is associated with inefficiencies. With the help of a number of 
comparative static results they analyse the trade-off between market failure and 
government interventions. Their analysis shows that, as long as the government 
interventions require bureaucrats to implement policies and at least some of them are 
corrupt, there exists some heterogeneity among bureaucrats, the optimal government 
intervention aimed at correcting important market failure will be associated with 
government failure. 
The relationship between corruption and market structure is empirically observed 
by Alberto Ades and Rafel Di Tella in Chapter 10. Their results show that corruption is 
higher in countries where firms have higher rents and where domestic firms are sheltered 
from foreign competition. It can be inferred from their analysis that  competitive market 
policy can play a significant role in combating corruption. 
And it is not only the market structure which matters. The degree of political 
competition is also important to the level of corruption. The last chapter, “Electoral 
Competition and Special Interest Groups”, by Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, 
examines how interest groups use campaign contributions, which may be in the form of 
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cash or in kind subsidy, to influence public policy. They conclude that “the party that is 
expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests” [p. 291].  
 The selection of articles conducts the discussion in a coherent manner and the 
book provides a deep insight into the issues related to corruption. Institutions, throughout 
the book, are assumed as an exogenous factor. The canvas of the book can be further 
broadened with the inclusion of some literature on the topic of endogenous institutions.  
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